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Bonus taxes have been implemented to prevent managers from taking excessive
risks. This paper analyzes the effects of taxing executives’ bonuses in a principal–
agent model. Our model shows that, contrary to its intention, the introduction of
a bonus tax intensifies managers’ risk-taking behavior and decreases their effort.
The principal responds to a bonus tax by offering the manager a higher fixed
salary but a lower incentive-based component (bonus rate). (JEL: H24, J30, M52)
1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007–2010 was the worst global economic crisis since the
Great Depression of the 1930s. Most of the world’s largest banks survived only due
to unprecedented bailout measures. G" 20 member states contributed US$ 7000 bil-
lion to save system-relevant financial institutions and approved economic stimulus
packages worth US$ 1400 billion in an effort to prevent an ongoing depression.
Switzerland, for instance, an important financial center in Europe, was hit hard
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(Buehler, Kaiser, and Jaeger, 2012). Its flagship bank, UBS, threatened to drag the
entire economy into turmoil.
The excessive risk-taking of corporate executives is commonly considered to
be one important cause of this crisis. It is well known that one reason for exces-
sive risk-taking can be found in the limited liability of corporate executives (e.g.,
Thanassoulis, 2009; Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010). Bank executives’ pay has been
tied to highly leveraged bets on the value of bank assets. Due to their limited liabil-
ity, executives benefit from the upside and are protected from the downside. As a
result, executives have little incentive to take into account the losses that risk-taking
could impose on shareholders and taxpayers.
As a response to the crisis, bonus taxes have been implemented in several coun-
tries. For example, in 2009 the U.S. House of Representatives approved a 90 % tax
on bonuses in firms that have received federal bailout money. In a similar fashion,
Ireland introduced a 90 % tax on executives’ bonuses in January 2011. In the UK,
bankers’ bonuses were taxed at 50 % for a period of several months in 2010.
Proponents of bonus taxes or pay caps for executives argue that these instru-
ments will prevent greedy managers from excessive risk-taking by limiting the up-
side potential of any form of risk-taking. On June 30, 2010, Arlene McCarthy, the
rapporteur in charge of the negotiations for the European Parliament, said in reac-
tion to the implemented cap on bankers’ bonuses:1 “Two years on from the global
financial crisis, these tough new rules on bonuses will transform the bonus cul-
ture and end incentives for excessive risk-taking. A high-risk and short-term bonus
culture wrought havoc with the global economy and taxpayers paid the price. The
public want banks to prioritize stability and lending over their own pay and perks.
In the last two years the banks have failed to reform, and we are now doing the job
for them.”
This paper analyzes the effect of a bonus tax on the manager’s risk-taking behav-
ior in a principal–agent model. Basic intuition might suggest that when the bonus is
taxed, the manager will react with lower risk-taking. Yet, the opposite is true. Our
model shows that, contrary to its intention, a bonus tax increases the manager’s
risk-taking behavior and decreases the manager’s effort. Furthermore, we derive
that the manager’s fixed salary increases, while the incentive-based salary compo-
nent (bonus rate) decreases. It is important to note that the objective of this paper
is not to analyze the interaction between limited liability and bonus taxes, but to
isolate the incentive effects of bonus taxes.
Before we proceed with the model, we will give a brief overview of the related
literature. The principal–agent problem arises through asymmetric information and
diverging interests between ownership and control. This agency problem was first
formalized by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and subsequently extended in vari-
ous directions (Mirrlees, 1976; Holmström, 1979; Holmstrom, 1982; Fama, 1980;
Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Grossman and Hart, 1983). The evolving literature on
1 See “European Parliament caps bankers’ bonuses,” European Parliament, June, 30th,
2010 (www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20100630IPR77285).
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executive compensation has been highly interdisciplinary and has spanned finance,
accounting, economics, industrial relations, strategy, organizational behavior, and
law.2
Even though there is a huge body of literature and numerous theoretical and em-
pirical research on executive pay, only a few papers study the consequences of ex-
ecutive pay regulation. For instance, Dew-Becker (2009) analyzes the government
regulation of executive compensation in the U.S. By discussing disclosure rules,
advancements in corporate governance, and say-on-pay, he analyzes the evolution
of pay regulation and concludes that mandatory say-on-pay could be the most ef-
fective and least harmful measure of controlling executive compensation. Knutt
(2005) examines diverse regulatory issues from a legal point of view. In this study,
he proposes the installation of independent compensation committees to support
current regulation practices. Hall and Liebman (2000) analyzes the extent to which
tax policy influences the composition of executive compensation and discusses the
consequences of rising stock-based pay.
However, to the best of our knowledge the effects of bonus taxes on executives’
risk-taking have not yet been analyzed in the agency literature.3 Dietl et al. (2013)
analyze the incentive effects of bonus taxes. They find that the effect of a bonus tax
on the agent’s compensation components depends on the interaction of the agent’s
level of risk aversion and the variance in the firm value. In contrast to our article,
they do not study how a bonus tax affects the risk-taking behavior of the agent. Our
model is also related to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and Hirshleifer and Suh
(1992) in the following dimensions. We base our principal–agent model on Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1987) and introduce a tax that is levied on the agent’s bonus.
To model the firm value, we follow the approach of Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) and
assume additive separability between effort and risk in the output function.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we develop our
principal–agent model. Section 3 analyzes the problem of the agent and the princi-
pal, respectively. Furthermore, the optimality conditions are derived and discussed.
In section 4, we present our results for a specific effort cost function. In section 5,
we examine the sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications. Section 6
summarizes the main results and concludes the paper.
2 For comprehensive surveys of research on executive compensation, see, e.g., Gomez-
Mejia, McCann, and Page (1985); Murphy (1999); Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003); and
Devers et al. (2007).
3 A strand of literature exists that analyzes the relation between stock-option-based
executive compensation and risk-taking. For example, based on 591 bank–CEO–year ob-
servations from 1992 to 2000, Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (2006) find that the stock of
option-based wealth leads to higher risk-taking in the banking industry. For theoretical
models that analyze the incentive effects of executive stock options, see Carmel (2008)
and Garvey, Grant, and King (1999).
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2 Model Setup
We consider a single-period employment relationship in a firm between a risk-
neutral principal and a risk-averse agent. The agent has two unobservable choice
variables to influence the firm value (output) denoted by x: productive effort a 2 RC
and risk-taking behavior b 2 RC. To model the firm value, we follow Hirshleifer
and Suh (1992) and assume that
x D aCb.kC"/;
where "  N.0;2" / and k 2 RC. The parameter b can be interpreted as the agent’s
choice of operating risky projects where the project return is captured by the pa-
rameter k. Hence, the agent can influence the firm value by exerting a certain ef-
fort a or by choosing a certain risk b. The agent’s risk choice b has two effects:
on the one hand, given k > 0, a riskier behavior increases the expected firm value
EŒx D aCkb, but on the other hand, it also increases the variance in the firm value,
V Œx D b22" . A higher value of the error term 2" can be interpreted as a more un-
certain economic environment (Bustamante, 2014) that creates a high variance in
the firm value or, alternatively, a situation in which the agent’s performance cannot
be measured precisely.
We follow Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) with respect to the following two points.
First, we assume that only effort a is costly, where c.a/ 2 C 2 with c0.a/ > 0,
c00.a/ > 0 for a >0, c0.0/D 0, c00.0/ D 0. Second, we neglect the agent’s limited li-
ability.4 Our objective is to analyze the incentive effects of bonus taxes in isolation
and not the interaction with limited liability. We know already from the literature
that limited liability increases the incentives for risk-taking (Thanassoulis, 2009,
and Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010).
Following the classic models in agency theory (Gibbons, 1998), the agent’s
salary p.x/ is linear and has two components: a fixed component and an incentive-
based component. We denote the fixed component by ı 2 RC and refer to it as the
fixed salary. We refer to the incentive-based component x as the bonus, with 
being the bonus rate (Gibbons, 1998, p. 116).5 The bonus is taxed at  2 .0;1/, so
that the agent’s (net-of-tax) salary becomes6
p.x/ D ıC .1/x:
4 For a paper that integrates limited liability in a principal–agent model, see, e.g., Sher-
styuk (2000), who discusses how punishment threats in contracts can discipline agents.
5 Note that in the literature on executive compensation  is also referred to as the pay–
performance sensitivity (PPS) or piece rate (see, e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Murphy,
1999; Faulkender et al., 2010; Schöttner and Thiele, 2010; Agranov and Tergiman, 2013).
6 In line with the agency literature, we assume that the principal offers the agent a
linear employment contract (see, e.g., Feltham and Xie, 1994; Baker, 2002; Wernerfelt,
2004; Hughes, Zhang, and Xie, 2005). In addition, for certain intertemporal contracting
problems in discrete and continuous time, it can be shown that the optimal dynamic com-
pensation scheme is linear (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; Hellwig and Schmidt, 2002).
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Because " is normally distributed and it is the only random variable in p.x/, it
follows that p.x/ is normally distributed, too:
p.x/  N.ıC .1/.aCkb/I b2.1/222" /:
The agent has an expected salary of EŒp D ı C .1 /.a Ckb/ with a variance
given by V Œp D b2.1 /222" . Hence, the gross salary paid by the principal is
ıCx, while the agent receives only a net-of-tax salary of ıC .1/x. The gov-
ernment gains x as tax revenues. Because our paper focuses on bonus taxes, we
do not consider other taxes such as income taxes on the agent’s salary or corporate
income taxes.7
The agent is assumed to be risk-averse with a constant absolute risk-averse
(CARA) utility function U.p;a/D er.pc.a//; where r 2 RC is the agent’s level of
absolute risk aversion. The agent’s expected net utility EŒUA can then be derived
as (see, e.g., Conyon and Sadler, 2001)
EŒUA D ıC .1/.aCkb/ 1
2
r2" b
2.1/22 c.a/;
where .1=2/r2" b2.1/22 is the agent’s risk premium required to compensate him
for the uncertainty in his expected salary. Moreover, the agent has an exogenous
outside option ! 2 RC. The outside option can be interpreted as the utility the agent
would receive in another firm or in a country without a bonus tax and therefore is
assumed to be exogenous.8
The risk-neutral principal maximizes her expected profit EŒP , which is given
by the expected output EŒx minus the expected gross salary payment EŒıCx:
EŒP  D .1/.aCkb/ı:
The timing has the following structure. First, the principal offers the agent the
employment contract .ı;/ given the bonus tax  2 .0;1/ set by the state. Second,
the agent either accepts the principal’s offer or chooses the outside option !. After
accepting the contract, the agent elicits effort a and risk-taking b.
3 Analysis
3.1 The Agent’s Problem
For a given compensation package .ı;/ provided by the principal, the agent max-
imizes his expected net utility EŒUA with respect to .a;b/. Henceforth, we denote
by  the product of the agent’s level of risk aversion r and the variance in the firm
7 For a study that analyzes different principals for the taxation of multinational enter-
prises, see e.g., Eichner and Runkel (2011).
8 In section 5, we analyze the implications of an endogenously determined outside
option.
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value 2" , i.e.,   r2" . We refer to  as the risk parameter. The agent’s maximiza-
tion problem is then formally given by
max
.a;b/0
²
EŒUA D ıC .1/.aCkb/b2 
2
.1/22 c.a/
³
with the corresponding first-order conditions:9
(1) @EŒUA
@a
D .1/c0.a/ D 0 and @EŒUA
@b
D .1/kb.1/22 D 0:
A higher effort a and a riskier behavior b generate marginal benefits .1/ and
.1/k, respectively, due to the higher expected firm value. At the same time, they
induce marginal costs of c0.a/ and b.1/22 due to larger effort costs and a
larger variance in the firm value, respectively. The first-order conditions state that,
in equilibrium, the marginal benefits of a higher effort and a riskier behavior must
be equal to the corresponding marginal costs. Based on the first-order conditions,
we establish the following lemma:
Lemma 1 A higher bonus rate  increases the effort a and reduces the risk-taking
b of the agent.
Proof Straightforward and therefore omitted.
A higher bonus rate increases the agent’s effort because the marginal revenue
of effort increases; at the same time, a higher bonus rate increases the marginal
revenue of risk-taking, .1  /k. However, the marginal cost of risk-taking,
b.1  /22, also increases for a higher bonus rate, due to a higher net-of-tax
variance in the salary. Because the latter (negative) effect dominates the former
(positive) effect, the agent reduces risk-taking.
3.2 The Principal’s Problem
The principal maximizes her expected profit EŒP  by choosing an optimal com-
pensation package .; ı/ and by taking into account the optimal behavior of the
agent. Formally, the principal solves the following maximization problem:10
max
.ı;/0
¹EŒP  D .1/.aCkb/ıº;
subject to the participation constraint (PC)
EŒUA D ıC .1/.a Ckb/ .b/2 
2
.1/22 c.a/  !
9 It is easy to verify that the second-order conditions for the maximum are satisfied.
10 We implicitly assume that, e.g., the outside option ! and the bonus tax  are suffi-
ciently small so that the principal obtains nonnegative equilibrium profits.
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and the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC)
.a; b/ 2 arg max
.a;b/0
EŒUA:
We derive the corresponding first-order condition in the following lemma.11
Lemma 2 The first-order condition of the principal is given by
(2) 1 k
2c00.a/
c0.a/2„ ƒ‚ …
revenue effect
D  C 
1 c
00.a/a„ ƒ‚ …
cost effect
:
Marginally increasing the bonus rate induces a marginal increase in the agent’s
effort, which has the following effects for the principal. On the one hand, an in-
crease in the agent’s effort generates a revenue effect (left-hand side): a one-unit
increase in the agent’s effort implies one-to-one higher expected revenue for the
principal (first term), but at the same time a higher level of effort negatively affects
the agent’s risk-taking, which reduces the marginal revenue (second term). On the
other hand, an increase in the agent’s effort generates a cost effect (right-hand side)
because the principal incurs the full cost of the bonus, while the agent receives only
a fraction 1 of it. This effect, which makes the use of a bonus more costly for
the principal, reflects the “leakage” in the contracting environment stemming from
the bonus tax. The cost effect is composed of two parts. (i) Higher effort generates
higher costs for the principal,  Cc00.a/a=.1/, because she must pay the agent
a higher bonus and incurs the full cost of the bonus. (ii) Higher effort generates also
more income for the agent, which relaxes the PC, and hence attenuates the cost ef-
fect. This income effect is given by c00.a/a. Combining (i) and (ii) produces
the cost effect.
3.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the principal offers the compensation package .; ı/, and the
agent responds with effort a and risk-taking b, which are implicitly defined by
 D 1c00.a/

k2
./2.1/2 Ca


1

; ı D !  .1/a  k
2
2
Cc.a/;
(3)
c0.a/ D .1/; b D k
.1/ :(4)
The two equations in (4) represent the agent’s optimal behavior, and the equa-
tions in (3) are derived by simplifying the principal’s first-order condition and the
PC, respectively.
11 All proofs can be found in the appendix.
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4 Results
To derive further insights, we specify the effort cost function and assume quadratic
effort costs, i.e., c.a/D .1=2/a2. This assumption is common in the corresponding
principal–agent literature (see, e.g., Schaefer, 1998; Baker, 2002; Laux and Laux,
2006; Marino and Zábojník, 2008; Roider, 2009). We proceed as follows. First, we
show the conditions under which an equilibrium exists and is unique. Second, we
analyze the effects of a bonus tax on the principal’s and the agent’s behavior. Third,
we analyze the effect of the risk and project return parameters on the principal’s
and the agent’s behavior.
For a quadratic effort cost function, the equations (4) and (3) simplify to
.; ı/ D

1 k
2
.a/2
a 
1 ;! 
1
2
.1/2./2  k
2
2

;(5)
.a; b/ D

.1/; k
.1/

:(6)
It should be noted that the equilibrium .; ı;a; b/ is still defined only implicitly.
We establish the following lemma, which holds for quadratic effort cost functions.
Lemma 3 For quadratic effort costs, a unique equilibrium exists if and only if k2 <
kmax  .4=27/.1/2=.1C/2.
It follows from Lemma 3 that the project return parameter k must satisfy an
upper bound defined by k2 < kmax to ensure the existence of a unique maximum. The
reason for this bound is as follows. A higher k increases the marginal revenue of
risk-taking, so that b increases. A higher b, in turn, decreases the effort a according
to Lemma 1. The lower effort a then decreases the bonus rate  (see (1)), which
yields a lower variance in the agent’s salary. As a result, the “cost” of risk-taking
decreases and converges to zero as the bonus rate converges to zero. The agent
would now have incentives to choose an infinitely high level of risk-taking behavior
b. Therefore, an upper bound must be imposed on the project return parameter k.
In the subsequent analysis, we assume that k2 < kmax to ensure the existence of a
unique equilibrium .
In a next step, we analyze the effects of a higher bonus tax on the compensa-
tion package .; ı/ and the agent’s behavior .a; b/. We establish the following
proposition, which summarizes our results.
Proposition 1 Under the assumption of quadratic effort costs, a higher bonus
tax  has the following effects in equilibrium:
(i) The principal reduces the bonus rate and increases the fixed salary
(@=@ <0 and @ı=@ >0).
(ii) The agent reduces effort and increases risk-taking behavior (@a=@ <0 and
@b=@ >0).
Part (i) shows that a bonus tax leads to a lower bonus rate and a higher fixed
salary, yielding therefore a lower incentive power of the contract. The result with
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respect to the bonus rate is intuitive from observing the principal’s first-order con-
dition given by (2). A higher tax has no direct effect on the revenue effect, but it
strengthens the cost effect because the agent receives a lower fraction of the bonus
paid by the principal. As a result, the principal lowers  if the bonus tax increases.
Furthermore, the principal chooses the fixed salary so that the PC is satisfied. On
the one hand, a higher bonus tax induces a lower bonus, but on the other hand,
it also lowers costs for the agent because his effort decreases. In equilibrium, the
decrease in the bonus is stronger than the decrease in the agent’s costs, so that the
fixed salary must increase to satisfy the PC. Therefore, the introduction of a bonus
tax shifts the compensation package from the incentive-based component (bonus
rate) to the fixed salary.
Part (ii) shows that, contrary to its intention, a bonus tax induces the agent to de-
crease effort and to increase risk-taking. By observing the agent’s first-order con-
ditions given by (1), we derive the intuition for this result as follows. Recall that
the marginal benefits of effort and risk-taking are given by .1/ and .1/k,
respectively. A higher bonus tax has a direct negative effect on these marginal ben-
efits, because it decreases the fraction 1 that the agent receives from the bonus.
Moreover, a higher tax induces the principal to decrease the bonus rate  in equi-
librium, yielding an indirect negative effect on the agent’s marginal benefits. As a
result, the agent decreases a in equilibrium, because the tax has no (direct) effect
on the marginal effort costs c0.a/. However, a higher tax has a positive effect on the
marginal costs b.1/22 of risk-taking because it decreases the salary variance.
The positive effect dominates the negative effect, and as a result the agent chooses
a riskier behavior b in equilibrium.
So far, we have analyzed the effect of a bonus tax. It is also interesting to con-
sider the effect of the risk parameter as well as the project return parameter. The
following proposition sheds light on this issue.
Proposition 2 Assuming quadratic effort costs, we derive the following results:
(i) A higher risk parameter induces the principal to increase the bonus rate
(@=@ > 0), while the agent reacts with higher effort and lower risk-taking be-
havior (@a=@ >0 and @b=@ < 0).
(ii) A higher project return parameter induces the principal to reduce the bonus
rate (@=@k < 0), while the agent reacts with lower effort and higher risk-taking
behavior (@a=@k < 0 and @b=@k >0).
Part (i) of the proposition shows that the compensation package shifts to the
incentive-based component if the agent is more risk-averse and/or the uncertainty
in the economic environment increases.12 In addition, the agent reduces risk-taking
and increases effort. Because a higher risk parameter only increases the revenue ef-
fect and does not influence the cost effect in the principal’s first-order condition (2),
12 Recall that a higher risk parameter  is the result of a higher risk aversion r of the
agent and/or a higher level of uncertainty in the economic environment reflected by a
higher variance 2" .
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the principal increases the bonus rate. It is intuitive that a higher risk parameter in-
duces the agent to decrease his risk-taking behavior due to the increase in his risk
premium. As a consequence, the agent increases his effort according to Lemma 1.
Regarding part (ii) of the proposition, it is intuitive that the principal lowers the
bonus rate for a higher risk parameter because a higher k decreases the revenue ef-
fect but has no impact on the cost effect in the principal’s first-order condition (2).
The agent reduces effort and increases risk-taking for a higher project return pa-
rameter because, according to the agent’s first-order condition (1), a higher k has a
direct positive impact on the marginal benefits but no direct impact on the marginal
costs of a riskier behavior.
Depending on the industry and the resulting degree of risk aversion, the level of
uncertainty in the economic environment, and the size of the project return param-
eter, a principal should take into account the relationships derived in Proposition 2
when hiring a new agent.
5 Robustness
In this section, we show that our results are robust with respect to the exogeneity of
the outside option and the specification of the cost function. First, we examine the
effects of relaxing the assumption regarding the exogenous outside option. Second,
we numerically simulate the model for effort cost functions with a constant cost
elasticity.
Endogenous Outside Option. So far, we have assumed that the agent’s outside
option ! is exogenously given. Recall that the agent always has the possibility to
leave the country that has introduced a bonus tax. However, one could argue that
the agent’s value of his outside option decreases with a higher bonus tax because
(i) finding new employment in another country generates costs for the agent and/or
(ii) the value of the (new) outside option decreases if the agent changes his job. In
the case of an endogenously given outside option !./, we establish the following
corollary.
Corollary Suppose that the outside option !./ depends negatively on the tax
rate, i.e., @!./=@ < 0. In this case, the results of Proposition 1 remain un-
changed except for the effect of a bonus tax on the fixed salary ı. If j@!./=@ j>
aj@a=@ j, then a higher bonus tax also induces a decrease in the fixed salary,
i.e., @ı=@ <0.
Proof The proof is straightforward, by noting that ı D !./  .1=2/.a/2 C
3k2=.2/ and @ı=@ D @!./=@  a.@a=@/. Hence, @ı=@ < 0 ,
j@!./=@ j>aj@a=@ j.
The result of the corollary is intuitive. We know that in the case of an exogenous
outside option, a higher bonus tax induces a shift in the compensation package
(2016) Taxing Executives’ Bonuses 11
Figure 1
Bonus Tax Effects for Different Polynomial Cost Functions
(a) Tax Effect on Effort
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from the incentive-based component (bonus rate) to the fixed salary. If, however,
the outside option depends on the bonus tax and a higher tax induces a sufficiently
strong decrease in the value of the outside option, i.e., j@!./=@ j > aj@a=@ j,
then the principal can decrease both the bonus rate and the fixed salary and still
satisfy the agent’s PC.
Effort Cost Function. To verify the robustness of our model regarding the speci-
fication of the cost function, we analyze the solutions to the equations (3) and (4)
for polynomial cost functions c.a/D a= with  D Œ1:5;2:5. Because the solutions
to the model are only implicit, we need to run a simulation. We set the parameters
as follows: ! D 1,  D 1,  2 Œ0I0:95, and k D 0:001. Figure 1 illustrates the results
for  2 ¹1:5;2;2:5º and displays the effect of the bonus tax  on the agent’s effort
and risk-taking, and on the principal’s choice of the bonus rate and the fixed salary.
We find that qualitatively, the results from Proposition 1 derived for the quadratic
cost function with  D 2 also hold for other polynomial cost functions with  close
to 2.13
13 We also tested other values of  in the interval  D Œ1:5;2:5 and find robust results.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the effect of a bonus tax on the risk-taking behavior of cor-
porate executives in a principal–agent model. In our paper, the firm value (output)
depends on the manager’s behavior in two dimensions. First, the manager can in-
fluence the firm value by exerting a certain effort. Second, the manager can choose
a project with specific exposure. A project choice with a higher expected return
simultaneously implies a higher risk. Therefore, the project choice influences the
expected value as well as the variance in the output. For instance, bank managers
dealing with credits face this kind of trade-off. Credit at low interest rates can be
assigned to firms with high ratings. Therefore, the bank has low expected prof-
its but also low risks. Otherwise, credit at higher interest rates can be assigned to a
start-up firm operating in a promising area but with high uncertainty. Thus, a higher
expected return can be achieved by being exposed to higher risks. We assume that
the principal offers a salary package consisting of a fixed salary and an incentive-
based component (bonus rate). The bonus rate increases with the manager’s output.
As the manager can only influence the output by his effort choice and the degree
of exposure, the realization or failure of the project is stochastic.
Our model shows that the introduction of a bonus tax unintentionally intensifies
the manager’s risk-taking behavior and decreases the manager’s effort. On the one
hand, a higher tax decreases the marginal revenue of risky projects, but on the
other hand, it also decreases the variance in the manager’s salary, implying lower
marginal costs. The second effect dominates the first, and therefore a higher bonus
tax induces the manager to increase his risk-taking behavior. Simultaneously, the
manager decreases his effort because a higher bonus tax decreases the marginal
revenue of effort. We further show that a higher bonus tax shifts the compensation
package from the incentive-based component to the fixed salary. Finally, a higher
risk aversion of the manager and/or a higher variance in the firm value induces the
manager to increase his effort and to decrease his risk-taking behavior, while the
principal increases the bonus rate.
Our results imply that a government should be careful when evaluating whether a
bonus tax is an appropriate instrument to introduce in order to prevent the excessive
risk-taking behavior of corporate executives. This article is a first step in analyzing
the effects of a bonus tax on risk-taking behavior in a principal–agent model. An
interesting avenue for further research would be to formally analyze the interaction
between limited liability and a bonus tax.
In our opinion, the issues surrounding the implications of bonus taxes remain a
fertile and important line of inquiry for economists, politicians, and regulators.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
With PC, the expected profit of the principal is given by
EŒP  D .1/.aCkb/!C .1/.aCkb/b2 
2
.1/22 c.a/:
Together with ICC,  D c0.a/=.1/ and b D k=.c0.a//, we obtain
EŒP  D

1 c
0.a/
1

aC k
2
c0.a/

! Cc0.a/

aC k
2
c0.a/

 k
2
2
c.a/:
Due to the relation  D c0.a/=.1/ between the effort a and the bonus rate 
given by the ICC, the principal is able to control the effort a. Therefore, we derive
the first-order condition of the principal as
@EŒP 
@a
D

1 c
0.a/
1

1 k
2c00.a/
c0.a/2

 c
00.a/
1

aC k
2
c0.a/

Cc00.a/

aC k
2
c0.a/

Cc0.a/

1 k
2c00.a/
c0.a/2

c0.a/D 0:
Resubstitution of c0.a/D .1/ yields the first-order condition of the principal as
.1/

1 k
2c00.a/
.1/22

 c
00.a/
1

aC k
2
.1/

Cc00.a/

aC k
2
.1/

C .1/

1 k
2c00.a/
.1/22

 .1/ D 0:
Rearranging of the first-order condition produces the claim. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Step 1: The principal’s first-order condition,  D 1k2=..a/2/a=.1/,
can also be written as
(A1) F./ .1/.12/ k
2
2.1/ D
2.1/2Œ1.1C/k2
2.1/ D 0;
taking into account that a D .1/ . We illustrate equation (A1) as a function of 
in Figure A1 for k D 0:005,  D 0:3, and  D 1.
The principal’s second-order condition is given by
@F./
@
D 2k
2
3.1/  .1
2/
Da=.1/D .1/

2k2.1/
a3
 .1C/

:
Hence, the SOC is satisfied if and only if
k2 <kSOC  .1C/
2.1/ a
3 aD.1/D 1
2
3.1/2.1C/:
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Figure A1
The First-Order Condition of the Principal
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γF(  )
1 γmax γ2
Step 2: We derive the following properties of the principal’s first-order condition
F./ D 0:
1. F./ is a continuous function in  2 .0;1/.
2. lim!0F ./ D 1 and F.1/D .1/k2=..1//< 0.
3. @F./=@ D .12/C2k2=.3.1//D 0 ,  D max  .2k2=..1/2.1C
///1=3. We further derive F.max/ > 0 , k2 < kmax  .4=27/.1 /2=.1C /2
and max 2 .0;1/ for k2 <kmax.14
4. max is a local maximum of F./, because @2F./=@2 D 6k2=.4.1//< 0.
Hence, @F./=@ >0 for  < max, and @F./=@ < 0 for  >max.
From properties 1–4, we derive that for k2 < kmax the first-order condition
F./ D 0 has exactly two roots .1;2/ in the unit interval, with 1 < max < 2.
Because @F./=@ represents the second-order condition of our initial maximiza-
tion problem, the root 2 is the maximum and characterizes , proving the ex-
istence of an equilibrium. Note that the second-order condition for a maximum
of the expected profit of the principal, EŒp, is satisfied for  D 2 > max, be-
cause the slope of F is negative, i.e., @F./=@ jD < 0. Therefore, if k2 < kmax,
then k2 < kSOC holds for . Since there is only one intersection of F./ with the
x-axis satisfying the second-order condition F 0./ < 0, uniqueness follows from
existence.
If k2 D kmax, then the first-order condition F./ D 0 has one solution in the unit
interval with  D max D 2=.3.1C//. In addition, it holds @F./=@ jDmax D 0 and
@3EŒp=@a
3 < 0 since @2F./=@2jDmax D 6k2=.4max.1//< 0. Therefore, the
expected profit of the principal, EŒp, has a saddle point (and not a maximum)
at max.
If k2 > kmax, then F./ lies below the x-axis in the unit interval, and thus no 
exists that satisfies the first-order condition F./D 0.
14 Formally, max < 1,k2 < .1=2/.1/2.1C/ and kmax < .1=2/.1/2.1C/.
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Therefore, the condition k2 < kmax is sufficient and necessary. The equilibrium
values (a, b, ı) directly follow from (5) and (6). Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Part (i): First, we will show that a higher bonus tax induces the agent to reduce
the effort a. To prove this claim, recall that F.;/ D .1  / .1  2/k2=
.2.1// D 0 represents the principal’s first-order condition. With the implicit-
function theorem, we derive
@
@
D  @F=@
@F=@
D  1C2 k
2=Œ2.1/2
.12/C2k2=Œ3.1/ :
With a D .1/, we obtain
@a
@
D .1/@

@
 D .k
2 2.1/2Œ1C.1//
2k2 C3.1/2.1C/ DW
A
B
:
As k2 < kSOC D .1=2/3.1/2.1C/ for  D , it holds that B >0. Moreover,
A <0 , k2 <k  2.1/2Œ1C.1/:
We further derive that
k >kSOC , 2> .3 1/ , 2

C1
„ƒ‚…
2.3;1/
> 3„ƒ‚…
2.0;3/
:
The last inequality is always fulfilled, and therefore we have shown that @a=@ <0.
According to Lemma 1, a higher bonus rate increases effort and reduces risk-
taking. Because the agent always reduces effort a through a higher bonus tax, it
follows that he increases risk-taking b, i.e., @b=@ >0. This proves part (i) of the
proposition.
Part (ii): To show that a higher bonus tax induces the principal to reduce the
bonus rate, i.e., @=@ < 0, we provide a proof by contradiction. Suppose that
@=@  0. The principal’s first-order condition is given by  D 1k2=..a/2/
a=.1/. Using the condition a D .1/, we obtain
(A2)  D 1  k
2
.a/2„ ƒ‚ …
inc. in 
 „ƒ‚…
inc. in 
Because @a=@ < 0, the term k2=..a/2/ increases in  . Under the assumption
that @=@  0, the term  increases in  as well. Hence, the right-hand side
of (A2) decreases in  . It follows that the left-hand side of (A2) must decrease as
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well in equilibrium. This result, however, contradicts the assumption @=@  0.
Hence, our assumption was wrong and it must be the case that @=@ <0.
To show that a higher bonus tax induces the principal to increase the fixed salary,
i.e., @ı=@ >0, recall that the fixed salary is given by
(A3) ı D !  1
2
.1/2./2  k
2
2
D !  1
2
.a/2  k
2
2
:
Because @a=@ < 0, the right-hand side of (A3) increases in  and hence the left-
hand side must increase as well, i.e., @ı=@ >0. This proves part (ii) of the propo-
sition.
Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that .a; b/ is given by (5) and .; ı/ is given by (6).
Part (i): Total differentiation of  with d D 0 and dk D 0 yields
d D k
2
2.a/2
dC 2k
2
.a/3
da 
1 da:
Total differentiation of a with d D 0 produces da D .1 /d . Combining the
two differentials, we obtain
d D k
2
2.a/2
dC

2k2
.a/3
 
1

.1/d
, d
d
D k
2a
.1C/2.a/3 2k2.1/ :
It is obvious that the numerator is positive in the last equation. At first sight, it
seems that the denominator is ambiguous. However, a closer look at the denomina-
tor shows that it is unambiguously positive because
d
d
>0 , .1C/2.a/3 2k2.1/> 0 , 1
2
3.1/2.1C/>k2:
The last inequality always holds because the second-order condition k2 < kSOC 
.1=2/3.1/2.1C/ holds for  D . The risk parameter has therefore a positive
effect on the bonus rate. It is easy to see that the risk parameter also has a positive
effect on effort, because a D .1/, so that
da
d
D .1/ d

d„ƒ‚…
>0
> 0:
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Next, we derive the effect of the risk parameter on b D k=..1 //. Total
differentiation of b with d D 0 and dk D 0 yields
(A4) db D  k
2.1/ d
k
.1/2 d:
We substitute the above-calculated differential d D Œk2a=..1 C /2.a/3 
2k2.1//d into (A4), and after rearranging, we obtain
db
d
D  k
2.1/ 
k
.1/2
k2a
.1C/2.a/3 2k2.1/„ ƒ‚ …
>0
< 0:
This proves the claim that the risk parameter has a negative effect on risk-taking.
Part (ii): Total differentiation of  with d D 0 and d D 0 yields d D
Œ2k=..a/2/dkCŒ2k2=.a/3daŒ=.1/da. Total differentiation of a with
d D 0 produces da D .1/d . Combining the two differentials, we obtain
d D  2k
.a/2
dkC

2k2
.a/3
 
1

.1/d
, d
dk
D 2ka

.1C/.a/3 2.1/k2 :
We derive that the bonus rate depends negatively on the project return parameter
because
d
dk
<0 , .1C/.a/3 2.1/k2 > 0 , 1
2
3.1/2.1C/> k2:
The last inequality always holds because the second-order condition k2 <kSOC 
.1=2/3.1/2.1C/ holds for  D . Therefore, a higher return of the project,
k, implies a lower bonus rate. Moreover, a higher k has also a negative effect on
effort a D .1/, because
da
d
D .1/ d

dk„ƒ‚…
<0
< 0:
Next, we derive the effect of the project return parameter k on risk-taking b D
k=..1//. We derive
(A5) db D 1
.1/ dk
k
.1/2 d
and substitute the above-calculated differential d D Œ2ka=..1 C /.a/3 
2.1/k2/dk into (A5). After rearranging, we obtain
db
dk
D 1
.1/ C
1
.1/2
2k2a
.1C/.a/3 2.1/k2„ ƒ‚ …
>0
> 0:
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This proves the claim that a higher project return parameter increases risk-taking.
Q.E.D.
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